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In this year’s Saltman Lecture, Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Liana G.T.
Wolf argue that restorative justice models have much to offer a broken attorney
disciplinary system.1 While their specific proposals are problematic for reasons
discussed more fully below, there is considerable merit to the authors’ larger
point that the lawyer disciplinary system could benefit from incorporating a
greater level of client participation. The authors point to a number of the benefits of a more client-participatory attorney disciplinary system, including the
opportunity for lawyers to better appreciate the consequences of their misconduct, the opportunity to focus on repairing the harm done to clients, and the
opportunity to restore the public’s faith in the fairness and legitimacy of the
legal system.2 This Comment focuses primarily on an additional benefit that
might flow from more client-participatory attorney disciplinary proceedings: by
opening the disciplinary process to the perspectives of clients, the legal profession gets the opportunity to evolve more client-centered norms of professional
conduct.
The attorney disciplinary system, Brown and Wolf argue, is overburdened
with complaints, the majority of which are based on neglect of client matters
and failure to communicate with clients.3 Complaints are made disproportionately against lawyers in small or solo practice and can largely be attributed to
structural challenges: the economic pressure of high volume individual client
practice with minimal infrastructural support, which precludes adequate communication and allows cases unintentionally to slip between the cracks.4 These
problems may be exacerbated in some cases by a lawyer’s depression or alcohol abuse, which can cause case management to spiral out of control.5 Relatively few cases involve serious fraud or intentional misconduct.6
For clients whose problems begin with poor communication from their
attorneys, the disciplinary system treats them to more of the same. Many complaints are summarily dismissed without further investigation.7 Others languish
for a year or more before being resolved, and only a handful result in formal
sanctions.8 Complainants have limited rights to notice and participation in dis* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
1 Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 254–55 (2012).
2 Id. at 282.
3 Id. at 259–60.
4 Id. at 260.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 259.
7 Id. at 258.
8 Id. at 262.

341

342

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:341

ciplinary proceedings; in many states, they are not even entitled to a copy of the
lawyer’s response to their complaints.9 Attorney discipline is handled as a dispute between bar counsel and the transgressing lawyer, leaving clients out in
the cold.10
The authors argue that restorative justice models, which have been successfully adopted in criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings as well as
in a variety of other settings, offer unique possibilities for improving the attorney discipline system.11 As a method of social discipline, they argue, restorative justice programs can balance the need in the attorney discipline system for
both control and support.12 The combination of control and support is lacking
in traditional attorney disciplinary systems, which either exhibit high control
over errant lawyers through serious sanctions like disbarment or emphasize
support for lawyers through educational or treatment programs.13 By bringing
complaining clients face-to-face with the lawyers whose actions or inattention
has harmed them, providing an opportunity for lawyers to understand the concrete ways in which their violation of professional rules has caused harm, and
by involving a broader range of community stakeholders to deliberate about the
appropriate sanctions or reparations, the authors argue that a restorative disciplinary system can both hold lawyers accountable and support their underlying
needs.14
Although restorative justice models are beneficial in many ways the
authors’ specific proposals for applying these models to attorney disciplinary
processes leaves unanswered many basic questions about fit and implementation. Although the authors’ main point is that more client participation in attorney disciplinary systems would be beneficial,15 they have not made a
convincing case for the necessity or appropriateness of the additional apparatus
of restorative justice they propose. The authors note that in the restorative attorney discipline processes they envision, a broader and more diverse group of
stakeholders, such as family members, law partners, and representatives of malpractice insurance, might be involved in circle discussions that focus on the
harm caused by the lawyer’s malfeasance and the most appropriate disciplinary
response.16 This suggestion arises by analogy to restorative justice programs
like family group conferencing and sentencing circles.17 However, the authors
have not grounded the call for such processes in a detailed analysis of how and
where disciplinary complaints fit within the spectrum of restorative justice
responses in the criminal justice system.
The authors concede that there has been very little study of what complainants in disciplinary proceedings want, but quickly conclude that
“[b]ecause the role of complainants in discipline is so similar to the role of
9

See id.
Id.
11 Id. at 2–3.
12 Id. at 275.
13 Id. at 275–77.
14 Id. at 274.
15 Id. at 254.
16 Id. at 255–56.
17 Id. at 254–55.
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victims in criminal prosecutions,” they must want the same things that crime
victims want.18 The assumption that complainants in attorney disciplinary cases
are like crime victims begs, rather than answers, the question of fit. Although
complainants in attorney disciplinary cases may be treated like crime victims in
criminal prosecutions, in that they are shut out of attorney discipline processes
except when needed as witnesses,19 it does not follow that they have the same
needs for restorative justice processes that crime victims have. Aggrieved clients might be better analogized to contract or tort plaintiffs pursuing private
disputes with their lawyers, rather than victims of crime who have experienced
deeper violations of their senses of safety, security, and personal integrity. If
contract or tort disputants are the better analogy, it is unclear why more traditional mediation processes in which disputing parties work out a limited settlement of their private dispute would not be a perfectly adequate way—and
perhaps the most appropriate and satisfying way from a client’s point-ofview—to be more involved in the process.
Even accepting the analogy of aggrieved clients to crime victims, the category of “crime victim” is itself diverse, ranging from victims of domestic violence by intimate partners, to store clerks who have been robbed at gunpoint, to
college students who have been date-raped, to business owners victimized by
juvenile shoplifters, to city park managers battling to clean up graffiti, to homeowners whose homes were broken into while they slept. The value and appropriateness of restorative justice responses may differ among these types of
criminal cases based on: the age, vulnerability, and maturity of the victim and
the offender; the kind of violation the victim experienced; and the existence of
a prior relationship between the offender and the victim. The authors do not tap
into the richness and nuance of this diversity by exploring where the prototypical attorney disciplinary case fits along the spectrum of existing restorative justice responses to various types of cases in the criminal justice system and
elsewhere.
Particularly puzzling is the authors’ call for a greater involvement of multiple stakeholders in restorative attorney disciplinary processes, such as the
lawyer’s family, the aggrieved client’s family, the lawyer’s law partners and
malpractice insurers, and anyone involved in treatment programs or support
groups for the lawyer.20 This is an important piece of the argument because,
according to the authors, the involvement of multiple stakeholders is the primary advantage that their proposed restorative attorney discipline processes
hold over existing mediation alternatives.21 However, unlike the involvement
of families in juvenile cases, which arises out of the insight that a child’s delinquent behavior is often inextricable from the dynamics of discipline or dysfunction within the child’s family, the connection between a lawyer’s professional
misconduct and the lawyer’s family issues are not immediately obvious.
The connection between a lawyer’s individual misconduct and unhealthy
dynamics within the lawyer’s firm is more obvious and seemingly more appropriate. In larger law firms, individual lawyers may be caught within a culture of
18
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questionable litigation tactics, irresponsible billing practices, and supervisory
hierarchies that tolerate unethical behavior; it may be difficult to extricate the
unethical behavior of the lawyer from the dynamics of the firm.22 However, as
the authors note, the run-of-the-mill neglect and failure-to-communicate cases
that dominate lawyer disciplinary proceedings arise largely in solo or smallfirm practices, and the questionable business practices that drive the misconduct result largely from lawyers’ individual decision-making.23 Even the “prototypical case”24 the authors have constructed to demonstrate the need for
restorative attorney discipline provides no clues about why a larger and more
diverse group of stakeholders would be appropriate or beneficial. In that hypothetical case, a solo practitioner named John Wilson neglects a deadline in a
case involving a small businessman named Tom Taylor; yet Wilson has no law
partners and the family members of Wilson and Taylor are never discussed.25
The authors leave unanswered additional questions about the stage at
which restorative disciplinary processes would be utilized and how those cases
would be screened and selected. The authors do not clarify whether the restorative disciplinary circles they envision would occur in lieu of investigation,
would be used for fact-finding, or would address the question of appropriate
discipline once a violation had been stipulated or found.26 This question is central to the issue of fit between the restorative disciplinary solution the authors
propose and the problems with traditional attorney disciplinary systems that
they identify. In their discussion of the problems with traditional attorney disciplinary systems, the authors focus on the large number of cases that are summarily dismissed without investigation, noting that the large number of summary
dismissals is a leading cause of public dissatisfaction with the lawyer disciplinary system.27 However, in their discussion of restorative justice programs, the
authors note that multiple stakeholder dispositional processes like sentencing
circles are “rarely used for first time offenders and relatively ‘minor’ criminal
activities” precisely because they require a high level of investment from community stakeholders.28 Even more modest victim-offender dialogues require a
relatively robust commitment of resources; the authors explain that prior to
22

See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1991) (calling for firm-level discipline to address the lack of fit between individual
discipline and group law practice).
23 Brown & Wolf, supra note 1, at 260.
24 Id. at 261.
25 Id.
26 The authors state that restorative processes would not be appropriate for disciplinary
cases where the lawyer denies the underlying charges of misconduct, suggesting implicitly
that they are dispositional rather than fact finding proceedings. Id. at 310. At another point,
however, they state the goal of multiple stakeholder circles is “to give input into the fact
finding processes, help make some decisions about the appropriate sanctions to be imposed,
and make commitments about how they will aid the attorney in performing the tasks
assigned him,” suggesting that the process would replace fact-finding at a traditional hearing.
Id. at 304. At still another point, they suggest that a benefit of restorative justice processes
would be “helping complainants to understand when negative outcomes are not the result of
professional failure on the attorney’s part,” suggesting that the processes should be utilized
even in cases where there is no actual rule violation, but merely a complaint. Id. at 282.
27 Id. at 264–65.
28 Id. at 290.
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conducting a victim-offender dialogue, the mediator will first meet with each
participant separately to explain the process.29 But, if an already overburdened
attorney disciplinary system is to invest in the more cumbersome restorative
justice processes proposed by the authors, it would run the risk of aggravating
rather than alleviating the larger problem of summary dismissal of the majority
of complaints. Moreover, as the authors point out, a poorly administered restorative justice system can be worse, from the victim’s point of view, than no
restorative justice system at all.30
Despite these unanswered questions about the implementation of restorative justice processes in attorney disciplinary proceedings, there is considerable
merit to the authors’ more general point that lawyer disciplinary systems could
benefit from incorporating a greater level of client participation, something that
the authors tell us well-designed diversion and mediation programs already
do.31 As the authors explain, the opportunity for the client to give specific
voice to the harm caused by the lawyer’s actions or neglect has benefits for
both the client and the lawyer: by bringing lawyers face-to-face with the clients
they have harmed, a lawyer’s “wrongdoing is discussed not just in the abstract
or technical terms of the rules, but also in terms of the concrete consequences
for the person most negatively affected.”32 In turn, the lawyer’s feelings and
perspective on the harm may expand “from mere embarrassment about a series
of mistakes (e.g., neglecting a matter, failing to return phone calls, and missing
a filing deadline) to a fuller sense of shame and sorrow about the consequences
those mistakes had on other people (e.g., their frustration, confusion, or additional economic loss).”33
Such experiences of face-to-face discussion of concrete harm hold out the
promise of an additional benefit not discussed by the authors: an opportunity
for the legal profession to evolve better client-centered norms of professional
conduct. To many commentators in legal ethics, more client-centered norms
may seem to be the last thing that the attorney disciplinary system needs. The
problem, in the view of many, is that professional norms already tilt too heavily
toward clients and away from the public interest.34 As I have argued elsewhere,
29

Id. at 289.
Id. at 295.
31 To the extent that clients are invited to participate in existing mediation and diversion
programs, such as the programs in Connecticut and Missouri that the authors discuss, the
clients’ involvement seems to be grounded in the restorative justice principles that the
authors identify. The authors explain that in their home state of Connecticut, the administrator of the negotiated settlement program makes concerted efforts to bring complainants into
the discussions about disposition, for the purpose of giving them an opportunity “to confront
the lawyer and receive an apology.” Id. at 266 (quoting an email from Mark Dubois, former
chief disciplinary counsel in Connecticut, to author Jennifer Brown). Moreover, they note
that some diversion programs include the option of mediation, which gives complainants an
opportunity to express the harm done to them by the lawyer’s misconduct and a role in
shaping the consequences that the lawyer faces. Id. at 264.
32 Id. at 303.
33 Id.
34 For well-articulated versions of this argument, see generally DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE:
A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998).
30
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however, the profession needs more truly client-centered norms to counteract
lawyers’ professional tendency to view their clients as walking bundles of legal
rights and interests rather than as whole persons.35 This tendency to “issuespot” clients and construct their objectives solely in terms of maximizing legal
interests can cause lawyers to minimize the importance of the other cares, concerns, commitments, relationships, reputations, and values with which the clients legal interests are intertwined.36 The call for the legal profession to
respond more fully to the actual desires and values of clients is especially apt in
the kinds of cases that form the core of our current lawyer disciplinary system:
the neglect and lack-of-communication cases that trigger complaints by individual clients against small-firm and solo-practice lawyers.37 A lawyer who has
heard a client’s concerns in overly legalistic terms may have actually overlooked the aspects of a client’s situation that are most important to the client.
The authors suggest that “factual questions [in disciplinary cases] may
raise serious issues about whether violations occurred and, if so, how severe
they are, but the underlying rule is rarely in doubt.”38 In my view, exactly the
opposite is true; while many of the missteps that ultimately land a lawyer in
ethical trouble are clear violations (such as missing a filing deadline), many of
the underlying norms of the legal profession are intentionally vague, leaving
much of the fine-tuning to the discretionary decision-making of lawyers. The
interrelated professional rules governing reasonable communication and the
allocation of decision-making between lawyers and clients, which are at the
core of much of the client dissatisfaction that triggers bar complaints, are good
examples of the ambiguities built into professional norms. For example, ABA
Model Rule 1.4, which governs attorney-client communication, states that a
lawyer shall “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter”39 and “reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”40 It also states that a lawyer shall
“promptly comply with reasonable requests for information”41 and “explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.”42 But the rule does little to spell out the
degree of communication that it is reasonable for clients to expect from their
lawyers.43 The determination of what level of client participation is necessary
35

Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-

ICS 103, 104 (2010).
36 Id. at 103.
37 Id. at 147–51 (discussing the difficulties inherent in expanding client value-based representation beyond the individual client context).
38 Brown & Wolf, supra note 1, at 297.
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3) (2010) (emphasis added).
40 Id. R. 1.4(a)(2) (emphasis added).
41 Id. R. 1.4(a)(4) (emphasis added).
42 Id. R. 1.4(b) (emphasis added).
43 The commentary to ABA Model Rule 1.4 states that “[t]he client should have sufficient
information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and
able to do so.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5. It goes on to state that
“[t]he guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for
information consistent with the duty to act in the client’s best interest, and the client’s overall
requirements as to the character of representation.” Id.
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to effective representation is spelled out in a different rule, which prescribes
that a lawyer must “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and . . . consult with the client as to the means by which they are
to be pursued.”44 However, the line between objectives and means is notoriously difficult to draw, leaving the demarcation of ultimate decision-making
authority unclear.45
In the face of unclear directives in the rules on communication and allocation of responsibility and elsewhere, lawyers must exercise professional judgment about how to act in the highly contextualized situations they confront in
law practice.46 For lawyers whose only concern is to avoid disciplinary sanctions—the prototypical Holmesian “bad men” who care about law only to the
extent that it will impose negative consequences47—the rules of professional
conduct provide a lot of room for lawyer mischief. Because of their punitive
nature, traditional disciplinary systems are unlikely to sanction anything less
than the most egregious and unreasonable judgments. Some legal ethicists have
conflated the freedom to maneuver within the rules with the problem of overzealous client advocacy.48 The primary problem with this minimal “regulatory”
conception, as they see it, is that it crowds out notions of lawyering in the
public good with the partisan directive that “the lawyer should defer to her
client’s instructions and seek to carry them out through any lawful means.”49
However, as others have pointed out, the freedom to maneuver within vague
professional rules is not inherently client-centered: lawyers who take a Holmesian “bad man” approach toward lawyer regulation may zealously advocate for
high-paying clients but are just as likely to avoid their obligations to their clients when zealous advocacy does not align with their own self-interest.50 The
problem of lawyer self-interest is likely to be aggravated in small and solo
practice with clients who are one-shot players with relatively little economic
leverage over their lawyers.51
44

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.2 suggest that “[c]lients normally defer to the special
knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their
objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters,” and that “lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2. Yet, other than the decisions to settle a case or to waive constitutional
rights in a criminal case, the rule declines to draw bright lines about how to resolve strategic
disagreements between the lawyer and the client. The rule on communication reinforces this
general division of responsibility by stating that “a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely
to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others” but that “a lawyer ordinarily
will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5.
46 See SIMON, supra note 34, at 195–96.
47 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
48 LUBAN, supra note 34, at 24–26.
49 W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 9 (1999).
50 See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 15–16
(1991).
51 Id. at 23.
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For lawyers who aspire to conform their behavior to professional norms
that rise above mere avoidance of sanctions, the question is how lawyers are to
understand, discover, or interpret those norms. Some of the most interesting
recent theoretical work in legal ethics has focused on reinterpreting the norms
of client loyalty, partisanship, and advocacy to take account of the role that
lawyers play in a liberal democracy.52 For example, Bradley Wendel has used
political and jurisprudential theory to argue that lawyers’ primary loyalty
should not be to clients themselves, but to advancing and protecting clients’
properly interpreted legal entitlements.53 However, as I have argued elsewhere,
the theories emerging from the recent turn toward political and jurisprudential
theory in legal ethics tend to position lawyers between clients and the law,
requiring lawyers to make professional judgments about what legal interpretations and tactics are legitimate without taking into account the perspectives of
their clients about whether the law is worthy of compliance and respect.54
In short, the professional understanding of what good lawyering means is
highly lawyer-centric. The rules leave it to lawyers to judge the meaning of
reasonable communication with clients and to do so within a professional culture that reinforces legalistic conceptions of what clients want. For lawyers
concerned only with avoiding sanctions, the reasonable communication standard provides plenty of wiggle room to get away with minimal attention to
client concerns, which works to the disadvantage of the very clients who end up
filing disciplinary complaints: one-shot clients of solo or small practice lawyers. Even lawyers who aspire to conform their conduct to higher professional
norms may be influenced by conceptions of their professional role that give
them professional authority to judge and screen the political legitimacy of their
clients’ goals.
The promise of more client-participatory attorney disciplinary procedures
is that they might counteract these lawyer-centric tendencies within legal professional culture and provide a vehicle for importing the perspectives of clients
into the definition and interpretation of disciplinary rules and professional
norms. Yet, problems in implementing this promise remain. To serve the purpose of reshaping professional norms in ways that better reflect the perspectives of clients, the disciplinary process would have to be open to clients at the
earliest stages, the stages at which most complaints are summarily dismissed. It
is at these earliest stages, where the system often rejects client complaints as
unfounded or de minimus, that the most beneficial education of the profession
is most likely to occur. However, the prospect that an overburdened lawyer
disciplinary system will suddenly absorb a dramatically expanded caseload of
de minimus violations does not look bright. The more realistic hope for restorative attorney discipline lies in the small spaces at the margins of existing mediation and diversion programs, where the principles of restorative justice have
an opportunity to influence and inform local practices. We can only hope that
52

See generally W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); DANIEL
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE
(2008).
53 WENDEL, supra note 52, at 49.
54 Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 522
(2011).
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when clients get a chance in those small spaces to express the harm that their
lawyers’ inattention or lack of communication has caused, the lawyers will
listen.

